Crisis? What Crisis?
Western Rationality in the Developing Bath of the Corona Crisis
1How is it possible to accept information about the world and about society as information about reality, knowing how it is produced?
2Luhmann 1996
3In fact history does not belong to us; we belong to it. […] The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life.
4Gadamer 2004: 278
5For over a year now, humanity has learned, literally first-hand, that the Covid crisis is far more than just a medical problem. Across the world, surprisingly efficient policymakers have issued restrictions governing contact and movement, which are in turn implemented and supervised by the police and the military. Kindergartens, schools and universities were, and to some degree are again, closed. Pupils, students and instructors raced to implement digital remote teaching as quickly as possible. Large events, including sports and music, were cancelled; holidays cancelled; millions of companies and freelancers face the threat of insolvency; and the global economy stands before a looming recession.
6Governments quickly cobbled together and ratified comprehensive aid and recovery packages in a signal that they had learned from the financial crisis of 2008 and its consequences. One image that will likely long remain in our collective memory is the completely empty square in front of St. Peter’s Cathedral in Rome on Easter Sunday 2020; usually, tens of thousands of believers would have filled the square to hear the Pope’s traditional Urbi et orbi blessing. This image, however, remains emblematic in two ways. First, it reveals the institutional core and the quintessence of symbolic procedure in each and every civilization; second, the image stages a prohibition that first enables the subject’s recognition as an Other and sets in motion the rocky process of identity formation. The fascinating thing about the Corona pandemic inheres in the fact that it makes something visible that goes far beyond the problems of the health care system. The cultural studies scholar Joseph Vogl has described this with the apt metaphor of the ‘developing bath,’ a tray filled with chemical solutions used to develop photographs in darkrooms:
The world has fallen into a developing bath, and it will take a little longer until we can see exactly which contrasts and contours will emerge for this or that state or government, whether they are terrible images or ones that inspire hope. (Buhr 2000)
7From a systems theory perspective, the present moment offers an outstanding opportunity to observe how the Corona virus aggravates various subsystems within society, and how these subsystems seek to translate these irritations into their own language so that they can adequately deal with them. At the same time, this disturbance reveals, with horrifying clarity, that society’s various subsystems follow extremely disparate differentiations in order to process this irritation. In other words, communication about system boundaries across societies ranges from difficult to impossible, which, particularly in the face of a global pandemic, has proven to be extremely problematic. Luhmann writes:
Each system, because of its own production of information, muddles along, continues its own autopoiesis on the basis of structural couplings, irritations, reactions and restructurings based on these, without being accessible, as a unit, from within or without. (Luhmann 1997: 1093)
8Along with its reality as a biological phenomenon—as a nucleic acid in a protein capsid that infects people and provokes long-term irritation—SARS-CoV-2 is first and foremost quite real as an element in a discourse system. Or, to phrase it differently, it first attains its reality as an object of a discourse enacted at the level of mass media. Following a well-known quote by Luhmann, we could say that what we know about the coronavirus is the same as what Plato knew about Atlantis: we’ve heard about it (1996: 9). In other words, the coronavirus manifests its destructive potential not just as an irritating element in the human organism by attacking cells and reprogramming their linguistic code so that they manufacture copies of the virus until they themselves die—no, because the virus has already long implanted itself in society’s discourse system and undermines it by posing the elementary question of dealing with the Other. Despite the refugee crisis, which will soon have held Europe in its grip for almost ten years, this virus-related question is encountering an astoundingly naïve public; there are several reasons for this. We can be certain that the worldwide strengthening of populist discourse in the context of xenophobia, racism and migration has paved the way for the coronavirus in a fatal manner.
9The conspiracy theories1 that have sprung up in the context of the Corona pandemic like mushrooms from the soil occasionally evince such an absurd character that normally we would only expect to hear such things in the high-security wards of psychiatric institutions, not as serious contributions to discourses circulating in social networks and public demonstrations. The fact that crude conspiratorial ideologies such as QAnon are being supported and distributed by various (so-called) prominent personalities testifies to the powerful need for narratives that provide a coherent worldview, regardless of how muddled they may be.2 The conspiracy theories that have arisen in the context of the Corona pandemic often incorporate elements of populist discourse or are propagated by populist political parties.3 Populist speakers typically assume that they, and only they, represent the real common sense of the people, which can no longer prevail due to a politically desired and medially produced delusion. It is in this context that Jan-Werner Müller emphasizes that this claim to sole representation represented by populist positions possesses above all a moral tone: “From [this claim to sole representation], it follows that contenders for power must be fundamentally disqualified as illegitimate.” (2019)
10Somewhat more generally, we could say that populism—because it foregrounds such ideas as self-determination, participation, freedom, etc.—stages itself as a new and authentic form of the public realm. In this context, digital transition, and the inherent transformation of the media landscape with its social networks and platform-based publics play directly into the hands of populism; news of all kinds published on such platforms as Twitter and Facebook are not subject to the journalistic review process, nor are they subject to the rationalizing drive of a high-quality medial discourse (cf. Strauß/Bogner 2020: 30). Quite simply, anyone can say anything about any topic within social networks.
11One of the central concerns of Corona conspiracy theories revolves around the constitution of a community of the knowledgeable or insiders who position themselves against the Other (politicians, the establishment, the media, globalization, etc) in order to articulate their ‘real’ or ‘alternative’ reality. The latest example was the French pseudo-documentary film Hold-up—Retour sur un Chaos from former journalist Pierre Barnérias (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FNzqj8j1Fg4), which appeared on November 11, 2020. The film, with a running length of almost three hours, allows various prominent speakers—including two Nobel Prize winners—to substantiate the central thesis that the coronavirus is a synthetic virus that was created in a laboratory for the purpose of killing the poor, making the wealthy even wealthier, and to subjugate society with global enforcement measures. The virus is presented as fundamentally harmless; vaccination and the wearing of masks, according to the film, are the true dangers. The film comprehensively examines the debate about a treatment method, developed by the physician Didier Raoult from Marseilles, that uses the malaria drug hydroxychloroquine and the antibiotic azithromycin to treat Corona infections; the film asserts that this treatment could not gain traction because of the pharmaceutical industry’s insatiable greed for profits. Across the world, a corrupt elite systematically deceive citizens in their pursuit of the goal of installing a global regime of capital. The renowned sociologist Monique Pinçon-Charlot, who appears in the film’s final sequence, summons the specter of a global class struggle that, she claims, will lead to a “Holocaust” programmed to “annihilate the poorest people in the world; 3.5 billion victims who are no longer needed for the world of tomorrow.” In a series of subsequent tweets, Pinçon-Charlot has distanced herself from the usage of the term “Holocaust,” but she has not revised her basic argument. Hold-up was viewed more than 2.7 million times within one week in France. Le Monde dedicated a comprehensive article to the film (Sénécat/Maad 2000), including a fact check, and Jürg Altwegg, writing in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, wrote that whoever had seen the film “needed a long time to recover from the frenzy of claims.” (2020)
12Times of crisis have always served as fertile ground for conspiracies. Viewed from a historical perspective, conspiracies have long been a proven method for interpreting disruptive events (natural catastrophes, plagues, ideological ruptures), thereby neutralizing them. Paradoxically, in many cases, the conspiracy narrative has appeared to be far more threatening than the real-world phenomenon that serves to trigger the narrative. Thus, one of the many Corona conspiracy theories claims that a naturally harmless Corona virus was genetically engineered in and released from secret laboratories financed by the WHO. The theory asserts that the WHO did this because the organization is subject to the control of Bill Gates, who wants to exploit the global virus pandemic to force the implementation of an exhaustive vaccination program. The Corona vaccine, on the other hand, is being spiked with microchips activated by certain Windows components, which will then turn people into mindless zombies under the rule of Bill Gates. Ironic commentary on this narrative has meanwhile become rife in social networks. One of the lines of argument runs thus: if Bill Gates has actually concocted and pushed forward this perfidious plan, then he is so clever that we actually should grant him dominion over the world …
13Yet the dynamic of these conspiratorial discourses has come to resemble a crucible that seems to be integrating Corona deniers, global conspiracy theorists, right-wing populists, esoterics, anti-Semites and fundamental system critics. At the ‘hygiene demonstrations’ in Berlin, it was not at all problematic for right-wing radicals to march next to left-wing vaccination opponents, QAnon conspiracy believers with members of the anti-government Reichsbürger movement. What was terrifying was the potential for rage and hate directed at the government, conventional medicine, the media, Bill Gates, Angela Merkel, high finance, the global Jewish conspiracy, pharmaceutical companies, the WHO, the U.S. Central Bank, the European Union, chemtrails, the obligation to wear a mask, etc.
It seems as if the main common ground shared by demonstrators, the glue that holds them together, is that they ignore one another; especially the radical nature of their contradictory demands. […] But these common grounds are not drawn from concrete policy proposals, but issue instead from a fixation on external threats. (Reichert 2020)
14The real or imagined threat scenarios are spelled out at the demonstrations as a threat to individual and/or collective freedom, whereby the bond that holds together these participants in the anti-Corona demonstrations—which are motivated by completely disparate concerns—is their shared understanding that they are the victims of the circumstances in which they find themselves. Slavoj Žižek has described the tendency to derive political legitimacy from the victim status of subjects as the result of contemporary subjectivity. This subjectivity is strangely disjointed, yet it contains two fundamentally antagonistic components: on the one hand stands the subject who is self-determined and feels responsible for his or her own fate; on the other hand, there is an opposing subject who “bases the authority of his speech on his status as a victim of circumstances beyond his control.” (Žižek 2019: 18).
This idea of the subject as a victim without any responsibility is drawn from an extremely narcissistic perspective, from which every encounter with an Other seems to be a potential threat to the precariously imagined balance of the subject; as such, it is not contrary or opposite; it is far more the inherent supplement of the liberal, free subject. […] The danger lies in the fact that, in the ongoing process of becoming aware, the ideology of personal freedom could therefore converge tacitly with the logic of being a victim, reducing freedom to the freedom to articulate one’s own status as a victim. (Ibid.)
15At the same time, this discourse is operationally designed for closure, meaning that it is not interested at all in a dialogue or a debate with other positions, since all of these positions are generally suspected of systematically suppressing the real veracity of the conspiracy theory. This facilitates aspersions against the public media as the “lying press,” the politics of established parties as the “Establishment,” which seeks only their own enrichment or to undermine democracy. Consequently, the restrictive measures adopted by governments worldwide against the spread of the coronavirus are interpreted as an attempt to permanently undermine the democratic legal order and the freedom of citizens guaranteed by it. Such an interpretation is also supported by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, who, as an historian of the state of emergency, now sees his views as confirmed by curfews and lockdowns. In late February 2020, for example, Agamben wrote in his blog, Quodlibet, that the measures undertaken to curb the virus—which he considers excessive—should be understood as follows:
First and foremost, what is once again manifest is the tendency to use a state of exception as a normal paradigm for government. The legislative decree immediately approved by the government »for hygiene and public safety reasons« actually produces an authentic militarization »of the municipalities and areas with the presence of at least one person who tests positive and for whom the source of transmission is unknown, or in which there is at least one case that is not ascribable to a person who recently returned from an area already affected by the virus«. Such a vague and undetermined definition will make it possible to rapidly extend the state of exception to all regions, as it’s almost impossible that other such cases will not appear elsewhere. […] It is almost as if with terrorism exhausted as a cause for exceptional measures, the invention of an epidemic offered the ideal pretext for scaling them up beyond any limitation.
16Now, we could say that Agamben’s statements have, in light of subsequent events, become absurd; the Corona crisis hit Italy particularly hard, and by the middle of November 2020, almost 50,000 people there had died of coronavirus infections. Agamben was writing just before the beginning of the first wave; in late February, the case numbers stood at approximately 240 positive tests per day, rising rapidly to over 6,500 cases per day by late March. Currently, the second wave of Corona has slammed Italy with particular vehemence: on November 13, 2020, 40,902 new infections were reported within just 24 hours.
17Despite these tragic developments, one of Agamben’s points cannot be dismissed: It is a fact that, throughout history, states have frequently declared states of emergency whenever they wanted to intensify their control of the population. And it is also correct that it has not always been clear whether a state of emergency would segue back to normality. Agamben discusses this extensively in his Homo sacer studies (2020), in which he traces a historical line from antiquity to modernity, arriving at the thesis that it is the concentration camp, not the state, that is “the biopolitical paradigm of the Western world.” (190) He identifies the extermination camps under National Socialism as a liminal space in which naked life is produced and the state of emergency becomes the rule rather than the exception (183). This initially irritating thesis then becomes plausible if, like Agamben and Michel Foucault before him, we believe that sovereign power always implies the production of biopolitical bodies. Foucault understands bio-politics as the ensemble of techniques of power that focuses on the population in its entirety, not on individual bodies. “Biopolitics is concerned with the population, with the population as a political problem, as both a scientific and a political problem, as both a biological and a power problem.” (2001: 285) These are techniques that “that allow, for example, without people noticing, to increase the birth rate or to direct the population flows in this or that region to an appropriate activity.” (Foucault 2003: 817). Foucault describes this biopolitical turn in the exercise of power, which according to Foucault occurred in the eighteenth century, as the governmentalization of the state, whereby governmentality is defined as the totality of institutions, processes, analyses, calculations and tactics
that allow the exercise of this rather specific and yet complex form of power, which has as its main target the population, as its main form of knowledge the political economy, and as its main technological instrument the dispositives of security. (Ibid.: 820)
18Foucault’s understanding of biopolitics contains, as Thomas Lemke emphasizes, a reflexive dimension, in that it places at the innermost core of politics what represents its external boundaries: the body and life (2008: 82). Understandably, it is tempting to see what is currently happening in the context of the Corona crisis as an incarnation of the biopolitical politics of power:
Governments advised by doctors force whole populations under a dictatorship of epidemics, dispense with all democratic obstacles under the aegis of “health,” even “survival,” and can finally govern the population as they have basically always done, more or less openly, in modern times: as pure “biomass,” as “naked life” to be exploited. (Sarasin 2020)
19However, the Swiss historian and Foucault expert Philipp Sarasin warns against equating this “biopolitical dream” with Foucault’s considerations of biopolitics in a rash way—not least because Foucault himself states that the governmental power of modernity (since the eighteenth century) departed from the disciplinary model of power that predominated in the seventeenth century, transforming into a liberal form of governmentality. The bestowal of freedoms then moves to the center of successful governance, because an optimal development of natural mechanisms only becomes possible if political interventions are reduced to a minimum (cf. Hälterlein 2015: 45). Foucault speaks of a governmental power that sees itself first and foremost as guidance “that can only be consummated by means of freedom and upon the freedom of individuals” (2004: 79).
20We should point out moreover that the measures deployed to contain the Corona pandemic cannot be described as a general confirmation of a biopolitical scenario as understood by Foucault, but that—despite all temptation—the recourse to Foucault should be more differentiated. Nevertheless, there is a great temptation in intellectual circles to interpret the socio-political implications of the Corona crisis as a confirmation of those theories critical of power and the system that have always been invoked. Biopolitics (Foucault), a state of exception (Agamben), critiques of neoliberalism and capital (Bourdieu, Negri, Hardt, Mouffe)—the list could go on and on. Conversely, the pandemic is leading to a coalition of critical thinkers who, across all theoretical differences, are advocating for more democratic and sustainable working conditions (https://democratizingwork.org).
21If we now inquire once again into the conditions that motivate crisis-related conspiracy theories, as well as the populist forces that fuel them, we can identify a fascinating interdependence of targeted disruption (Corona demonstrations) and disrupted communication (conspiracy theories). The conspiracy theorists and Corona deniers appear as a discursive conglomerate united by the intention to disrupt—and at best overthrow—a discursive order perceived as hegemonic. Corona deniers are therefore not that far removed from the Trump supporters who stormed the Capitol in Washington; neither group wore masks, of course. At the same time, a conspiracy narrative such as QAnon, which is shared by Corona deniers and militant Trump supporters alike, is deeply disturbed in itself, since it radically eludes the normative power of a rational order characterized by rationality. The term for this kind of disturbed psychic disposition, well-established since antiquity, is “paranoia.” In the following, I would like to take a closer look at the relation between intended disruption and disturbed reason.
22The concept of disruption became relevant for the humanities and the social sciences particularly through the confrontation between approaches in cybernetics and the communications sciences. The transmitter-receiver model of Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver, which was developed in the 1940s to provide a mathematical foundation for information theory, made a particularly prominent contribution to the way in which the nature and consequences of disturbances could be considered. Shannon and Weaver define disturbance as noise, in the sense of background noise or static, thereby summing up everything that does not belong to the signal itself. Here, disturbance means the difference to the signal, the non-intentional, accidental obstacle to undisturbed information transmission between the sender and receiver (see also Gansel/Ächtler 2013: 7). Later approaches in media theory then showed that, in the end analysis, it is this background noise that, as a disruption of information transmission, renders the mediality of media visible and thereby invites observation at one level removed. This function of disturbance can also be verified in social processes in which real or imagined disruptions do not just contribute to making invisible mechanisms visible, but also become themselves a tool of biopolitical control (cf. Koch/Nanz/Pause 2016).
23Disturbances—understood as irritations—are conceived of in a fundamentally positive way in the context of Luhmann’s systems theory. Background noise—as a still undefined (because it has not yet been processed according to a system’s operative code) irritation—appears initially to the environment as a surprise, as a disturbance, which requires communicative processing within the system. The irritating disruption points out to the system a change in the environment that must be reflected upon within the system and processed. In this context, Luhmann writes of self-irritation, which can motivate a system to create new couplings in its own structural elements. Disturbance, understood in this way as a productive irritation, then becomes a central factor in systemic evolution; or to put it differently, without disruptions, social systems would be incapable of learning. Luhmann writes:
Systems with temporalized complexity depend on constant disintegration. The ongoing disintegration creates, as it were, space and the need for successor elements; it is the necessary co-cause for reproduction. […] [It] is not […] a matter of returning to a stable resting position after the absorption of disturbances, but of securing the incessant renewal of the system elements. (1987: 79)
24Long before Shannon and Weaver and Luhmann, Franz Kafka dedicated an entire story to the phenomenon of disturbance. In his 1928 story The Burrow (Der Bau), a badger-like creature’s need for security is disturbed by a hissing noise and is driven into a paranoid panic.
What is it? A slight hissing, only audible in long pauses, a nothing to which one could, I don't want to say, become accustomed; no, one could not get used to it, but which one could observe for a while without doing anything outright about it for the time being. (2001: 195)
25The perfidious thing about this narrative is that it never really becomes clear whether the disturbing noise is coming from outside, or whether it is an expression of the animal’s deep-seated paranoia and thus must be understood as a disturbance of the self (see also Mein 2003). The interpretive attempts that revolve around Kafka’s narrative, and here in particular around the understanding of disruption, are paradigmatic in that reflection on disruption “underlies in principle the processing and constitution of meaning in the semantic household of cultures” (Jäger 2010: 316).
26Whoever wants to speak of disturbances must presuppose the idea of order; of a structure, of whatever kind, which is irritated by the intrusion of the disturbance. In a religious perspective, that which is ordered comes, of course, from God, who is the last and universal guarantor of order. The fascinating aspect of the divine act of creation is therefore not so much the creatio ex nihilo, i.e. the creation of the world out of nothing, but rather the binary structural logic with which the Creator goes to work and distinguishes between light and dark, heaven and earth, above and below, water and land, plants and stones, animals and humans. Each thing and living being has its predetermined place; the world is categorically divided in the course of its emergence; creation means here to order the chaos in which everything was mixed and to transfer it into a timeless presence of the paradisiacal state which is therefore ‘good’ because it is ordered. In Thomas Mann’s Doctor Faustus, Adrian Leverkühn excitedly quotes the Thirteenth Epistle to the Romans: “The powers that be are ordained of God.” (1967: 64) This quotation is, as it were, a prolepsis for what follows, for Leverkühn will raise himself to the status of a genius creator and, with twelve-tone music, develop a strict, because orderly, compositional technique, admittedly only with the help of the devil and at the price of his own salvation. The idea of order is of course not only found in the Bible; it is an inherent part of almost every cosmogony. Also in Plato’s Timaeus, we encounter the idea that the divine creator wrought a meaningfully ordered cosmos from formless chaos, to which he gave the greatest possible beauty.
27The religious promise inherent in such narratives is clear. The reality created by God is an ordered one fashioned for mankind. The world is, as structured, meaningfully aligned to the human being, i.e. the human being has a fixed place in the structure of the divine order. This transcendent promise of salvation is, however, extremely susceptible to disruption, because it is threatened by daily experience with a reality that obviously cares very little about man’s need for salvation. Theologically, this has been understood since the late Middle Ages to mean that God’s counsel completely eludes human rationality. Hans Blumenberg has written in this context of theological absolutism, with which he characterizes the dilemma of a faith that must think of God simultaneously as a benevolent Father and as a God who has become completely incomprehensible. The world appears as the pure fact of reified omnipotence, a demonstration of the unrestricted sovereignty of an unquestionable will, which at the same time means that this world no longer has any order accessible by man (cf. Blumenberg 1996: 194). In a world that has become contingent in this way, however, the basic eschatological assumption that the world was created solely for the sake of man becomes doubtful. However, if this theological certainty of salvation is no longer guaranteed, man falls completely out of the determination of the sense of the world (ibid.).
The God who does not compel himself, who cannot be fixed to any consequence of his manifestations, makes time the dimension of uncertaintypar excellence. This concerns both the identity of the subject, for whom the moment of his present does not guarantee a future, and the existence of the world, whose radical contingency can turn from being into appearance, from reality into nothingness, from one moment to the next. (Ibid.: 181)
28The central question is therefore, to use Luhmann’s words: “How does society, in the normal course of its operations, come to terms with a future about which nothing certain, but only more or less probable or improbable, can be determined?” (2003: 3) In other words, if contingency is understood as the central disturbing element of order, which can no longer be divinely guaranteed, man must develop strategies to compensate for the intrusion of contingency. Therefore, the program of human self-assertion is now set against the loss of God’s reliability by compensating, with all means necessary yet while keeping it at a distance, for the absolutism of a reality that is as unfamiliar as it is uncanny, as ruthless as it is overpowering. “The complexity of the world, the uncanny multiplicity of possibilities, must […] be reduced to a format that can be experienced in a meaningful way,” (Luhmann 2005: 92) and this succeeds in that man, deprived of his metaphysical guarantees for the world, constructs for himself a counterworld of elementary rationality and availability (Blumenberg 1996: 196 f.). In essence, then, it is a matter of man recoding the conditions of possibility of his access to the world and thus of his existence, which implies a fundamental change in his understanding of the world and the expectations, assessments, and interpretations of meaning implicit in it (cf. Blumenberg 2009: 103). Meaning and understanding of the world now result from man’s autonomous effort to reconcile certain meanings and determining patterns of interpretation with the general indeterminacy of reality. The formulation of general laws for the moving bodies of nature—from the astronomy of Copernicus to the physics of Galileo and Newton—corresponds with the idea of a special rationality of the political and social being, which detaches itself from the exemplary character of divine world government and seeks its principles within itself (cf. Vogl 2010/11: 31). The modern man knows, like Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, that the order of the world is not guaranteed (any longer), but therefore not impossible: it has to be established.
29This calls for an authority to provide guarantees for the order and truth of speaking. Pierre Legendre calls this mythical-fictional authority a reference, whereby it must be underscored that it is a dispositive, something “that has no fixed content, but can only function under one condition: It must be filled” (Seba 2011: 80).
30Let us take stock for a moment and observe that the production of cultural patterns of order is an anthropological necessity required to keep the absolutism of reality at bay. In other words: It is a matter of blocking out the constant noise of contingency.
31The exponential growth of knowledge—which has in the first place made possible such contemporary patterns of questioning and order—generates at the same time however a completely new form of complexity. Simple answers no longer exist; we could say that modernity is damned to transform contingency into complexity. A broad array of scholarly, journalistic, theological and political narratives are stepping into the place of a master narrative. These new ways of interpreting reality are then perceived as disruptive because of their complexity. The Babelesque confusion of interpretations, which in turn exposes the indeterminacy of the world to the contingency of interpretations, calls the meta-interpreters to the scene (cf. Schneider 2010: 22). Their aim is to provide new, simple, and above all unambiguous answers. “There must be a reason, proclaims modern paranoia, a true, ominous reason that enables us to explain the constant disruption of the world!” (Ibid.) We need only take a cursory look at current events to recognize that this need for simple answers exists in all political camps and religious groups. Some of the narratives proffered in this context have such a gripping simplicity that we have to ask ourselves whether what Kant wrote in 1784 about the use of one’s own reason in What is Enlightenment? Has completely eluded the adepts of these interpretive accounts. Because in fact:
Paranoid reason interprets without a hint of doubt, and when its proofs and conjectures stray into the extreme and delusional, it sometimes draws a knife or aims a pistol at conspiratorial ghosts. Or it detonates explosives because no savior is appearing on the horizon to eliminate the complexity and contingency of the world in one grand gesture. (Ibid.)
32This raises a central question: How can this order, whatever it may be, be legitimized? In other words: Who is the guarantor of this order, and how can such an order be produced in the first place? The French psychoanalyst and historian of law Pierre Legendre placed this question directly at the heart of a theory that he calls dogmatic anthropology. For Legendre, order means a culturally variable type of rationality that could also be described as a society’s principle of reason. This denotes a specific arrangement of reality, and this construction, according to Legendre, “brings forth a particular type of institutions, a politics of causality, with which those institutions of prohibition work which we in the Western world call state and law” (2001: 49). What does this mean?
33Every society and every culture is confronted with the task of instituting constitutive subjects as subjects. One does not enter the symbolic order as biological flesh and blood, but as a described body, meaning as a domesticated, culturally shaped artefact. It is no coincidence that the term ‘subject,’ derived from the Latin subjectum, means subordinated. This means that the human being, in the course of his enculturation, has learned to identify himself with an image—a specific position in the system of institutions—that he receives through cultural institutions. Vitam instituere was the name given to this process in Roman law: to establish life. Institutional power is based on the fact that it meets the boundless desire of the subject to separate from itself, to recognize itself as something other. To follow Kafka, institutions welcome people when they come and dismiss them when they leave. Institutions are places where the subject can articulate its love and desires. Only here on the stage of institutions is it guaranteed that desire has a place, that it stages a scene, that it says something and can be integrated as that which is said into the culture.
34The crucial question now is: Who provides guarantees for the respective institutional system? Who guarantees the coincidence between the ego and its image, who guarantees the order of filiation? If the ego is to be able to recognize itself as an Other, it requires a third instance that authenticates existence in the world as a true assumed relation of meaning. Bernhard Waldenfels has formulated the idea that the subject cannot posit itself out of itself, but requires a third dimension in order to be generated, as follows: “What we are is not based on individual or shared designs; instead, we first become a collective ‘we’ by means of the pervasive gaze of a third instance that, in extreme cases, approaches the divine gaze of an ‘absolute third instance.’” (2008: 115) This means however that every institutional system, or every culture confronts this task of setting this epiphanic constitution of the third as an absolute referent, as a founding image, into action. It is the institutions that, through their work of staging the scene, call forth into being the necessary metaphysical third party to speak and act on its behalf. The institutional nature of human life therefore describes the dimension that, “as a fictional order […] is intended to bring the unspeakable onto the stage” (Legendre 2012: 133) (Legendre 2012: 133). As Legendre writes:
A society must be founded in order to speak, that is, it must be empowered to hold a discourse that is attributable to society as such and not to individuals. Establishing such a fictional subject is the primary goal of institutional montages. Once this logical step has been taken, law emerges as a consequence, as a discourse that can be traced back to the monumental subject. (Ibid: 190)
35Institutions create a culturally specific language and image order, which as conceptual frameworks linguistically and aesthetically stage the reference, i.e. precisely those necessary fictions that are indispensable for the reproduction of humanity (cf. Mein 2011: 31). What Legendre is concerned with in his Dogmatic Anthropology, then, is to understand the interlocking of institutional and subjective structures necessary for the constitution of a human subject, those mechanisms and techniques of subjectivation, in other words.
with which every political organization […] touches the unconscious desire of the subjects, makes them believe, rejoice, exult, hate, despair, and die; those mechanisms and techniques without which, conversely, power could not be what it is, namely power of humans over other humans. (Pornschlegel 2011: 62)
36All this succeeds because institutions create the illusion of a referentiality between language, law and culture, through which they authenticate the normative foundation of the dimension of identity. Here, it holds that institutions must “provide representation through something,” as Anton Schütz emphasizes; “nothing is not enough.” But what is then concretely processed attains only secondary importance: “A shack assembled from fakes that separates subjectivity from its abyss is enough.” (1998: 327)
37It is therefore important to emphasize that institutionally mediated orders of reason are subject to historical change and always undergo new phases of representation, whether as a church, as absolutist state, as racist ideology, as parliamentary democracy or as industrial management society. But regardless of how the discourse of transcendental reference is shaped, it is always the case that the reason of these orders primarily stages and articulates itself through prohibitions. This is so because the entire construct ultimately serves nothing other than to regulate desire, both on an individual and collective level.
38Sigmund Freud illustrated this idea in Totem and Taboo with a famous story about the collective murder of the primal father by his sons, a scene which symbolizes the transition from a state of nature to culture. Freud imagines a “Darwinian primal horde,” an original state of society in which a “violent, jealous father […] keeps all of the females for himself and drives away the maturing sons.” (Freud 2000: 425) At some point, the sons gang up on the father, kill him, and eat him. At this communal feast of remembrance, each of the sons takes on a piece of their father’s strength. After the murder, however, the sons notice that they have become rivals to one another. Also, the murder of the primal father releases among the brothers a new consciousness of guilt. “The dead man now became stronger than the living man had ever been,” writes Freud, because what he had prevented earlier through his physical existence “they forbade themselves in the psychological situation of […] ‘subsequent obedience.’” (Ibid.: 427) Henceforth, the place of the dead primal father is forbidden to every subject; to keep his place free qua prohibition is the father’s function as representative of the founding “in the name of speaking” of the absolute reference. The ‘no’ or the ‘name’ of the father (le nom du père) thus blocks the structural position of the absolute and prevents its identificatory appropriation. This primal scene of prohibition is not difficult to decode as the beginning of the process of enculturation; the subject who subjects himself to this law inscribes himself thereby into an order that speaks in the “name of the father.”4 By making the paternal function of the law legible in a psychoanalytic way with this enigmatic narrative, Freud illuminates, as Pierre Legendre emphasizes, the central, culture-constituting mechanism of “the organization of a speech of legality”:
It is speech produced by a fictitious subject. As the speech of a fictitious subject, it principally transcends any single subject. It enacts a fundamental representation that institutionally presides over the control of drives. […] At the center of this speech of legality is the notion of the mythical father with whom, if I may say so, we put our lives on the line. As far as concrete familial practices are concerned, whatever the cultural version of this idea, this reference to the mythical father consists fundamentally in keeping the absolute at a distance, by making of this father a sign of absolute reference. (2011: 142 f.)
39For this reason, following a formula from Roman law, Legendre puts forward the thesis, which at first seems paradoxical, that man must be born a second time: First as a biological entity from the mother, and then again from the father, meaning the paternal function of the law, as an instituting subject, as an individual who submits to institutional order, to the law, to prohibition. This prohibition imposes upon the subject the separation and the assumption of his rightful place within society: as father or son, as husband or wife, as parent or child. The prohibition forbids the subject
to be able to occupy all places and thus abolishes the illusion of a disorienting capacity for being everything. […] At the same time, the illusion of that—frightening—omnipotence is thereby contained, to which the subject is subject precisely when its relation to the others is not relativized and not negated, that is, when it can neither impute a limit to itself nor to the others or their marking by the law. (Pornschlegel 2011: 72 f.)
40The course of both individual psychogenesis and cultural sociogenesis can of course lead to major disturbances. The relationship to fathers in the familial context is not the only problem; the relationship to institutions is typically also laden with tension. One of the most formidable allegories for this tension-packed relationship is Franz Kafka’s story, Before the Law. A doorkeeper denies a man from the country admission to the law, although, as we discover later, this entry was only meant for him. “It is possible, but not now,” says the laconic doorkeeper. This leads the man to persevere and wait before the law until he ultimately dies. The innumerable interpretations of this story generally view the doorkeeper as a representative of religious, political or other kind of power—an arbitrary father-figure, so to speak, that in a perfidious way bars the way to the subject’s request to enter into the law.
41Against this background, the aforementioned interdependence of rebellious disruption by means of the disturbed communication of a paranoid reason can now be interpreted in a new light. What emerges is a line of conflict between subjects—who can be understood as de-institutionalized in some sense—and the law. This line of conflict became emblematic on August 29, 2020, when Corona sceptics and right-wing extremists attempted to storm the Reichstag building in Berlin, or when militant Trump supporters stormed the Capitol in Washington on January 6, 2021. These and other attacks around the world on government buildings by Corona sceptics have a historical precedent that may make it possible to understand what the actual motivation of this escalation might be.
42On May 8, 1984, a young private of the Canadian Army invaded the National Assembly of Québec. He wanted to kill the government. Denis Lortie stormed through the corridors of the parliament building, shot around with an automatic handgun and after a short time got into the meeting room of the parliament, the so-called Salon bleu. What he had not expected was that the National Assembly was not in session that day, and the hall was empty. Denis Lortie sat down in the president’s seat, negotiations began, and attempts were made to disarm him. Finally, Lortie gave up. He had killed three people and injured eight. During interrogation, he uttered only one sentence: “The Quebec government had my father's face.” (Legendre 2011: 65 ff.)
43Legendre—himself a lawyer and psychoanalyst—interprets Private Lortie’s crime as a patricide, a murder of the father, which is why he added the subtitle Trial of the Father to his book, The Crime of Private Lortie. Lortie comes from humble beginnings and joins the Canadian Army at 17, where he serves to the general satisfaction of his superiors. He becomes the father of two children. Lortie’s own childhood, on the other hand, was marked by a violent and incestuous father, a primal father in the Freudian sense who mistreated his own family through despotic outbursts of violence and repeatedly sexually abused and severely maltreated not only his wife but also his daughters. Lortie gives detailed information in court about the situation of his childhood and about his fear of becoming a father just like his own. His own fatherhood takes on an apocalyptic dimension for Lortie. Even the smallest and most fleeting gesture of child-rearing appears to Lortie as an unbearable act of violence.
44Lortie’s crime is thus embedded in a specific family situation in which the order of reason and prohibition were, so to speak, eroded from within. The question that arises here is thus: What is the nature of an identity formation process that, under certain circumstances, can only be re-established in an inverted way through a killing spree? Legendre's answer is that in Lortie’s family the genealogical exchange of places was not carried out. Genealogy here means much more than the mere accumulation of social roles. Rather, the genealogical process is organized through loss, i.e., through the symbolic exchange of places of the subject, each of whom occupies his or her juridically designated place, on the basis of the Oedipal relationship.
Genealogy includes assigned and prohibited places for each generation. One is not both son and father, daughter and mother for the same person. Sliding on the genealogical axis, the transition from being a child to being a parent, is the most delicate maneuver of the symbolic exchange of places. It is not natural, and comes at a cost. Not only does the exchange of places come at the price of what is called the symbolic murder of the father by the son, it also requires of the son the price of his own, also symbolic, death as a son in favor of the newborn. (Legendre/Papageorgiou-Legendre 1990: 74)
45In Lortie’s family, a genealogical falsification or distortion was now at work, “which made impossible the normal course of subjective separation and the circulation of prohibition between generations” (Legendre 2011: 121). The violent and incestuous father prevented the necessary circulation and recognition of the law’s commandment to engage reason. The symbolic exchange of places did not take place. This context allows us to comprehend Lortie’s rampage as a theatrically staged scene of victimhood through which the murderer demands something, namely that form of relationship that allows him to occupy a place as a living human being among other living people; a relationship that normally is guaranteed by the genealogical transmission of the prohibition through the custodianship of the father role yet, in Lortie’s case, could not be completed. It is important to emphasize here once again that the killing of the father cannot be considered equivalent to the killing of a random person. Because of the position that the father assumes in subsequent generations, patricide is also a crime against a structure: the genealogical structure of filiation, the continuity of which is guaranteed by the law. Thus do two dimensions of the law overlap in the figure of the father: first, the general political-institutional dimension, or the law in the sense of a juridical apparatus; and second, the Oedipal-subjective dimension that the law configures in accordance with the ‘no’ of the father. Both dimensions display structural similarities in that they embody a speaking entity, speech that calls upon an unattainable order (God, the law, justice, etc.), which Legendre describes as reference. The point now is that Lortie’s rampage attacks the father in the form of the institution of the law, in order thereby to restore his own genealogical order—even at the price of his own life. In the final analysis, this is about attacking the law in order to attain the capacity to (finally) submit to prohibition, to inscribe oneself as a subject into the symbolic order.
Indeed, one must not forget that when Lortie enters the scene of his bloody rampage, he also wants to die, he is waiting to be killed, and to be killed according to all the rules of the law. In other words: the murderer himself awaits his just death sentence, which is due to him, by means of a staging that institutes the victim scene. (Ibid.: 105)
46Lortie’s attempt to kill the government of Québec because it bears the face of his father—understood as both patricide and self-sacrifice—accordingly belies his aim to institute himself, as a victim, by killing under all of the rules of the law and thereby submitting himself to its judgment.
47In this context, the video recordings of Lortie’s act played a decisive role in the course of the trial. They do not merely repeat the event, but have a cathartic function for the defendant Lortie, as it were, by making him commemorate his own subjective death. According to Legendre, the video camera fills a void in Lortie as he runs amok: “It fills that void in which the perpetrator had lost mastery over himself.” (Ibid.: 94) For Lortie, according to Legendre, is “the survivor of a total failure of reason, someone who has returned in one piece from a state of total loss of self” (112). Through the confrontation with his own image, Lortie, as a subject, is, for the first time in his life,
called upon, in a radical way, to see himself separated from himself in the dimension of the third. His subsequent view of himself as the one who commits the murder is a view that Lortie therefore no longer has to avert and that he can also cast upon himself and endure precisely because he is founded and thus separated from the act. This view became possible at the end of a long process of coming to terms with the act, in which the institutional third party effectively played the role of the separating third party. (Ibid.: 112 f.)
48The theater of the law performs the re-enactment of the act in symbolic space, Cornelia Vismann 2011 emphasizes. This applies in particular to the Lortie trial. The confrontation with his own image within the framework of a highly formalized and ritualized legal process, in which the office of the judge must in principle be conceived from the point of view of reference, that is, in his relation to the institutional third party, enabled the defendant Lortie to resume his place as a human being in the human herd. This succeeds because the trial makes the crime imaginable as a transgression. Representing the crime as a transgression is the only possible way to make the prohibition itself present, Legendre emphasizes. This is the real and central task of any judicial process: “The crime must be humanized and represented as a transgression so that it can be given a place in language.” (Ibid.: 43) At the same time, Legendre trusts the judges of the Lortie trial to transform the self-evidence of the images into a procedure through which the disturbed subject recognizes itself as the subject of the disturbance and can be re-integrated in this way.
49The crucial question that now arises is the following: How can this interpretation of the Lortie case yield insights into the relationship between the latest attacks on governmental buildings in Germany and the USA? Certainly, no one will assume that the demonstrating Corona sceptics and militant Trump supporters necessarily had to have experienced traumatic childhood experiences comparable to those of Dennis Lortie. Nevertheless, the recent attacks on institutions can also be deciphered as fundamental rebellions of a paranoid reason against the order itself and thus as symbolic patricide. What is the reason for this rebellion? And why right now?
50In general, the structuring work of institutions is done in secrecy, behind the scenes. In Kafka’s The Trial, Josef K. does not know why he is arrested. Western, Christian institutionality has imposed a peculiar latency constraint on itself, a tendency to anti-institutionality, which obscures the central performance of institutions and makes them incommunicable—admittedly without thereby preventing them (cf. Schütz 2001: 56). The institution therefore performs its work of embedding the subject into the dominant discursive order, and does so behind the back of its subjects. This succeeds because the subject unconsciously internalizes the prohibition that the institution manages. Thus the law no longer appears as an external commandment imposed from the outside, but as a self-bestowed imperative generated by one’s own reason and that promises autonomy. The trick here, as Joseph Vogl once put it, is for the individual to train himself in listening to his inner voices: “This is supposed to be the effect of all the educational projects and moral teachings. In the end, you can listen to the voice of the law, the common will within yourself, and know what is to be done.” (Klinggräff/Smoltczyk 2012) For Vogl, the Enlightenment philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, with his primordial scenes of bourgeois society, stands at the beginning of a rigid new population policy based on self-control. Rousseau’s concern did not culminate in the slogan “back to nature,” and democracy and popular sovereignty were not his concern either; his issue was with the perverse happiness of being governed (ibid.). This enjoyment of being governed does not of course occur immediately and without pains; it must be philosophically legitimized, then learned, internalized, believed and practiced. Only when the yoke of the law is understood as the crown of reason does the paradox of freedom through subjugation gain plausibility. In other words, there is a long way to go before people become ‘natural’ puppets of morality. The goal of the entire eighteenth-century Enlightenment movement, culminating in Kant’s famous dictum Sapere aude! could be provocatively summarized as a large-scale program of forgetting the law by internalizing it. The autonomous subject, whose emergence—or should we say construction—in the eighteenth century has been illuminated down to the last corner, thus appears as a miracle of dressage. Put differently, the power of the institution in modernity “stands and falls with the success of the modern shame transactions of transfer of responsibility and transfer of institution, that is, the legally effective assumption of the institutional burden by the instituted subject” (Schütz 1998: 322).
51Apparently, something about these sham transactions no longer works, and not just since the world fell into the developing bath of the Corona crisis. However, this developing bath has made visible, in a much more radical way, that something in the process of institutionalization is no longer running as smoothly as it should. One problem seems to be that in the age of modernity it is increasingly apparent that reference as the ultimate justifying instance of causality and rationality is in itself recognized as empty of content. The theological and mythological filler discourses of past epochs are reduced to absurdity. Religion, as it were, cannot be contemporary by definition. Its potential to open up structurally to current questions is limited, as Luhmann points out, because alternatives and every form of opening up are associated with the danger of blowing up the established religious form:
Even at more concrete levels, it is difficult to accept this opening. One can ask: if wine and bread are not available, why not malt beer and bananas? But then it would have to be determined beforehand which problem is being solved here, because otherwise one would lose sight of any restriction. (2002: 118)
52And it is precisely here, namely in the restriction, that a central problem lies, because what could not be coded religiously? Yet this also gives rise, “after hundreds of years of theological obfuscation, to the tragic question (the one posed by Greek tragedy): Why laws?” (Seba 2011: 81) What modern subjectivity appears to be losing gradually is the guarantor that guarantees that constitutive separation in the process of subject formation through which it becomes possible to recognize oneself as another in the first place.
53If we examine the militant Trump supporters who, after successfully storming the Capitol, grouped up for selfies in front of the insignia of American democracy in sometimes bizarre indigenous costumes, it becomes clear that this is primarily about symbolic politics. These people have come—like the man from the countryside in Kafka’s story—to enter the law. A gatekeeper was unable to stop them. Once they arrived, however, they found that the law was empty; the politicians were evacuated. When Lortie finally reached the Chamber of Deputies during his rampage, he found that Parliament was not in session that day. The chamber was empty. Lortie sat down in the seat of the Speaker of Parliament, who is called L'Orateur (“the speaker”) in Québec, and fired his machine gun into the empty room and at the surveillance cameras. It is quite striking that Richard Barnett, a window fitter from Arkansas who was among the demonstrators who stormed the Capitol in Washington, had himself photographed in a similar manner on the office chair of Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
54According to a pessimistic diagnosis by Legendre, we are in the face of the unrestricted hegemony of the logic of the economic and the concomitant global domination of management,
confronted with the risk of the irreparable: the shattering of those assemblages that give support to the humanized subject. […] The unhinged culture bids farewell to its taboos, but the beings threatened with dissolution plead for their lives before they have even begun. They invent ways out, mystical parents, the vision of a totem with which they can ally themselves. (2010: 134)
55Given these images, who would disagree with Legendre’s diagnosis? Incumbent U.S. President Donald Trump, as his nation’s political leader, sparked an armed—and, for at least five people, deadly—revolt against his own administration. He sent his supporters to the Capitol just as the House of Representatives was about to formally ratify the election results, results that were obtained in a democratic election and remained unaffected after formal appeals, audits, and recounts. The timing was well chosen, because although it is a purely formal process of confirmation, here the politicians perform an act that is ritualistic to a high degree, through which they enact that fragile process in which power passes from one biological body to another. What Ernst Kantorowicz has shown with the example of the political body of the king in the Middle Ages basically also applies to the political body of the American president. As the bearer of power, his body is emblematic, i.e. both alive and symbolic: Dignitas non moritur. As the highest representative of political power, a power based on the sovereignty transferred to him by the people in the electoral process, the symbolic body is immortal. That is why it is of such immense importance to stage this symbolic body of presidential power. In the Middle Ages, there were castles and ceremonial gardens for this purpose, a court with its rituals and festivities, at the center of which was always the king. Today, there are honor guards, Air Force One, the Oval Office and ceremonial acts of office, but the idea has remained the same: Power must be enacted, for through it is set in motion that process of authentication that enables institutions to dispense justice, teach students, perform marriages, and levy taxes—in short, to establish civilization, emancipate life from its biological origins, and guarantee the truth of speech. If in the Middle Ages one referred again and again to the fact that power ultimately came from God himself—one was king or emperor by the grace of God—modern power legitimizes itself, of course, first of all by the fact that it was elected democratically; but then, above all, also by recourse to one’s own history, i.e., by reference to the tradition and genealogy of democracy.
56Donald Trump’s predecessor in office showed a good sense of such connections. After his election to the presidency, Barack Obama gave an impressive inaugural speech to more than a million people in Washington on January 20, 2009. At the time, the world was looking into the abyss of the financial crisis, which had hit the U.S. particularly hard with the bursting of the real estate bubble. At the end of his speech, Obama recalled an important event in American history, namely the legendary Battle of Trenton on December 26, 1776, which marked a decisive turning point in the American War of Independence. In this battle, Hessian regiments in British service were crushed by the American Continental Army under the leadership of George Washington. While the fighting morale of the American troops was at its lowest point before the battle due to a series of defeats, this victory decisively stabilized the situation of the independence fighters again. On the eve of the battle, George Washington had his soldiers read a text that had been written three days earlier by Thomas Paine, one of the founding fathers of the United States. This is the background one needs to know in order to understand the context in which Obama situates himself at the end of his speech. Now, of course, Obama did not give his countrymen a history lesson, but rather invoked a narrative that is deeply anchored in the collective memory of Americans—and the way in which he invokes this narrative is nothing short of impressive.
So let us mark this day with remembrance, of who we are and how far we have traveled. In the year of America's birth, in the coldest of months, a small band of patriots huddled by dying campfires on the shores of an icy river. The capital was abandoned. The enemy was advancing. The snow was stained with blood. At a moment when the outcome of our revolution was most in doubt, the father of our nation ordered these words be read to the people:
»Let it be told to the future world […] that in the depth of winter, when nothing but hope and virtue could survive […] that the city and the country, alarmed at one common danger, came forth to meet [it].«
America. In the face of our common dangers, in this winter of our hardship, let us remember these timeless words. With hope and virtue, let us brave once more the icy currents, and endure what storms may come. Let it be said by our children's children that when we were tested we refused to let this journey end, that we did not turn back nor did we falter; and with eyes fixed on the horizon and God's grace upon us, we carried forth that great gift of freedom and delivered it safely to future generations. (Cit. in https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Inauguration/president-obama-inauguration-speech-transcript/story?id=6689022)
57The narrative that Obama develops here does not merely recall a significant historical event. Rather, it is a discourse that, as a lexis, answers the question: Who are you? In this sense, it is a discourse of justification addressed at exactly the right moment by the right person to the right audience. It assigns to the American people, and thus to each individual American, a genealogical place in their history, thereby elevating (separating) them from their mere biological existence and instituting them as citizens of a nation. As Legendre once pointedly put it, “[E]verything is not enough to produce human flesh. Man needs a reason to live.” (2010: 69) The storming of the Capitol almost exactly twelve years later is, as it were, the inversion or perversion of this discourse. The motivations of many demonstrators are perhaps compatible with the idea of defending freedom. However, they are attached to a conspiracy narrative, driven by the paranoia of an unfettered father figure in the presidential seat, who has succeeded in permanently shaking the confidence of a large part of the population in the democratic process. It should be mentioned only in passing here that the question of the symbolic staging of democratic rule—especially in the age of the post-national—is one of the great challenges of the present. As early as 1931, Eric Voegelin had pointed out this desideratum in a review of Carl Schmitt’s constitutional theory with regard to the constituents of parliamentary democracy. In his view, there is a lack of “belief in the embodiment of the people in a living allegory, which under certain circumstances is deified,” in the possibility of “experiencing rule originally in the image [and] only secondarily in a rational justification” (103 f.). It is not difficult to see that it is precisely this point of entry at which contemporary right-wing populism begins by offering nationalist filler discourses for subject constructions.
58Ultimately, paranoia means, as has already been explained above, the denial of contingency. It is about the sovereignty of interpretation of a reality whose interpreters, true to Hegel’s dictum, have set out to “remove the coincidental” from history (Hegel 1955: 29). Manfred Schneider brings it lucidly to the point when he remarks:
The paranoiac is a revenant of the fabulous detective Sherlock Holmes, who has strayed into politics or history, deciphering random signs better than anyone else, and from them being able to corroborate the most far-fetched suspicions. Every movement, every look, every sign, every message, to him, testifies to an evil intention, a conspiratorial power or a divine hand. (2010: 13)
59Behind this need to interpret reality completely and to transform contingency into necessity, there is ultimately nothing other than the rationality paradigm of modernity, which has its magisterial principle the proposition of the sufficient reason. “Coincidence,” according to Hegel, “is the same as external necessity,” (1955: 29) the incomprehension of which in the philosophical tradition reveals nothing other than irrationality. The world, however, must be explicable, completely and sufficiently, and that in synthetic judgmentsa priori, insists Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. Then—and only then—does the subject agree to abandon philosophical speculations about the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. Thus, when there is a switch from faith to knowledge, it is also accompanied by a different discourse of justification, which, as already indicated above, makes above all the celebration of autonomy through an internalization of the law the hallmark of modernity. In precisely this modernity, according to Niklas Luhmann,
the mental realm, in which the distinguishing of man was located, was rethought in the direction of a self-referential system, which is also certain of itself without detours via criteria. The system has its peculiarity in the self-referential structure of consciousness. It is called subject, because it is the basis of the comprehension of the world. (2008: 193)
60Mythical and religious filler discourses of Western reference have thus become largely obsolete. Similar to the categorical imperative, the authenticating structure of the subject reveals itself to be exactly what it actually is: empty. In other words, identifying the structure of reference as empty of content is only possible “because the (theological, Christian, or liberal) filler discourses have been exhausted” (Seba 2011: 80 f.). Nevertheless, the institutional logic is not out of force, because even the rationality paradigm of modernity, be it as rationality of reason (Kant) or rationality of action (Habermas), is able to separate the subject from its abyss. To recognize the subject as a subject under these conditions means, of course, also to recognize
that the human being is outside of itself: that it is not an autonomous, self-centered, self-governing unit of action, a small sun among others. The postulate of self-government and rational choice, the concept of the individual resting in himself, knowing best about himself, his aims, intentions, desires, motives, appear as artful phantasmagoria, as contingent contents of a truth montage. (Schütz 1998: 317)
61Now it is also one of the main experiences of modernity that with the increase in complexity in social structures, which necessarily goes hand in hand with the structural reconstruction of the social system from stratification to functional differentiation, the contingency of cultural semantics also increases. In other words, the rationality paradigm itself is coming under increasing pressure, and it is not possible at present to say exactly what might take its place. It is not only true that modern rationality is unable to completely resolve the complexity of reality (and to bid farewell to chance); rather, in its search for comprehensive justification, rationality has encountered constellations of problems that must remain rationally undecidable in the system itself, as Kurt Gödel in particular showed in 1931 with his incompleteness theorem for logic. According to Luhmann, the uncertainties with regard to the conceptual version and assessment of rationality are necessarily conditioned by the differentiation type of modern society, which processes precisely through evolution, which makes predictions about the future impossible (2008: 207). At the same time, modern society generates a huge amount of redundancy—especially through mass media communication.
But if social redundancy arises mainly from the fact that everyone is constantly confronted with messages that discontinue expectations: How and in what sense can structures emerge from this that enable the social system to be rational? (Ibid.: 225)
62And Luhmann was not at all familiar with the excesses of smartphone-based media reality with its social networks and communication channels, not to mention the Twitter messages of a Donald Trump. The flip side of all modern progress and all media evolution is far more than a new confusion. It is a constant, radical change combined with an increase in insecurity, uncertainty, disruption and contingency. Against this background, paranoid reason and its conspiracy theories have a paradoxically enlightening function, for they expose the fictional character of the rationality paradigm.
63And perhaps that is what we can learn from the Corona crisis. It has made visible, much more radically and much more quickly, something that until now has been the subject of primarily academic discussion: that tragic question of, why laws? This question is far more than a legal technical problem, for it touches the very ground of human existence. The semantics of rationality is confronted here above all with the problem of complexity through redundancy, since the flood of images of the mediatized present makes it impossible to agree (once again) consensually on a founding principle—on an overarching filler discourse of reference. No gatekeeper stands before the law anymore—paranoid reason can enter unhindered.
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9Some have suggested that it might be more appropriate to speak of conspiracy ideologies, since ‘theories,’ from a scientific perspective, must be based on verifiable facts and must be falsifiable, criteria that the so-called conspiracy theories do not usually meet. See for example Wolfgang Wippermann: Agenten des Bösen. Berlin 2007, p. 7.
9On the subject of conspiracy and narration, see the instructive article by Spiegel e. a. 2020.
9For example, the wearing of masks in the American presidential election campaign was a distinguishing difference between Democrats (who wear masks) and Republicans (who, following the example of President Trump, often refused to wear masks). CNN then shared a short but powerful clip on Twitter under the hashtag #factsfirst on July 31, 2020, ending with the formula: This is a mask. This is not a political statement. https://twitter.com/cnnpr/status/1289161706279546880
38»Im Namen des Vaters müssen wir die Grundlage der Symbolfunktion erkennen, die seit Anbruch der historischen Zeit seine Person mit der Figur des Gesetzes identifiziert« (Lacan 1991: 119).